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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate a program designed to improve the work quality of 
employees at a food distribution warehouse. Participants (n = 23) were responsible for selecting 
food items to be distributed to restaurants. Selector errors were targeted using an adapted 
incentive program featuring tiered goals and individualized normative feedback. A pre-existing 
incentive program, wherein selectors forfeited money for each error, was adapted to allow the 
selectors the opportunity to earn back their disincentive money upon attainment of weekly goals 
that were increasingly demanding. The initial goal for the first two weeks was set at 2.0 errors 
per 1000 cases and every two weeks thereafter the new goal was reduced by 0.1 errors per 
1000 cases until the final goal of 1.5 errors per 1000 cases. Weekly graphic feedback included 
public posting of individual errors rates. The mean errors per 1000 cases for the experimental 
group decreased 10% from 3.16 during baseline to 2.54 during the intervention. The largest 
decreases in errors was observed in the mid-level performers (with baseline error rates between 
2 and 3.5 errors per 1000 cases). A cost-benefit analysis revealed potential savings of 
$9,799.50. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
 
 
 
Incentives have been shown to be more effective than hourly pay in 
 
influencing employee performance because they provide monetary reinforcement 
 
contingent on the worker’s performance (Abernathy, 
 
Duffy,&O’Brien, 1982; Gaetani, Hoxeng,&Austin, 1985; Orpen, 1982). 
 
Incentive program contingencies differentiate them from other types of 
 
pay-for-performance compensation systems, such as profit sharing, and 
 
gainsharing. Incentive programs provide reinforcement closer in time 
 
to the targeted behavior because the monetary reward can be distributed 
 
in weekly paychecks. The reinforcer is also probable because employees 
 
are guaranteed incentive pay contingent on individual performance 
 
instead of on group or organizational performance. Although individual 
 
incentives may be considered small, they are available each and every 
 
time a unit is produced. Therefore, this type of compensation system is a 
 
popular technique because it sets up the conditions needed to encourage 
 
the desired behaviors that lead to increased performance (Redmon & 
 
Agnew, 1991). 
 
 
Whereas an incentive program provides reinforcement for desirable 
 
performance, a disincentive program includes a response cost of money 
 
loss for undesirable performance, such as errors (Abernathy et al., 
 
1982). Disincentives can be analogous to punishers or negative reinforcers 
 
depending on the targeted response. When disincentives are 
 
used in attempts to decrease an undesirable response, they are analogous 
 
to punishers. If the targeted behavior is the desirable response, dis- 
 
incentives are analogous to negative reinforcers. In this case, the 
employee would exhibit the desired response in order to avoid the negative 
consequence of losing money. 
 
Often incentives and disincentives are paired together. Gaetani et al. 
(1985), for example, provided billing feedback to auto mechanics, followed 
by feedback plus incentives (i.e., 5% of the money billed to customers 
over a goal) or disincentives (i.e., pay reduced by a percentage 
when below the goal) depending on their performance. The results 
showed that performance increased when feedback was provided, but 
increased more during the feedback and monetary incentive/disincentive 
program. 
 
Likewise, Abernathy et al. (1982) implemented a feedback intervention, 
followed by a feedback and incentive/disincentive program intervention 
among proof operators in a bank. Goals were established for 
incentive pay and monetary penalties were assessed for avoidable errors. 
This incentive/disincentive program was associated with an increase 
of over 150% in proof operators’ performance and remained at 
the same level for over 2 years. 
 
These studies demonstrate that incentive/disincentive programs can 
be effective in increasing desired performance immediately, as well as 
over the long-term. No studies, to our knowledge, have investigated the 
repayment of the disincentive component contingent on the decrease of 
undesirable performance or the increase of desirable behavior. In this 
situation employees lose money for incorrect behaviors and then would 
have the opportunity to earn back disincentive money when corrected 
behaviors meet a certain goal. 
 
The present study examined the effects of an adapted incentive program 
that included the repayment of disincentive money when the undesired 
performance was below a goal. Instead of simply having money 
taken away for errors, employees were allowed the opportunity to earn 
back their money when their number of errors occurred at low rates. A 
goal of low rates was used because although error-free performance 
was desired, it was next to impossible to achieve. 
 
 
 
VARIATIONS OF FEEDBACK 
WITHIN INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
 
By their very nature, incentive programs are paired with feedback. 
Employees are informed of their performance levels when they receive 
or don’t receive incentive pay contingent on performance. Feedback becomes 
a discriminative stimulus for the reinforcement when paired with 
 
reinforcers such as incentive pay (Daniels, 1989). A discriminative 
stimulus indicates that a response is likely to be followed by a reinforcer 
(Sulzer-Azaroff & Mayer, 1991). Additionally, when reinforcement is 
attained for increases in performance, the feedback delivered with the 
reinforcer becomes a conditioned reinforcer (Sulzer-Azaroff & Mayer, 
1991). Feedback paired with tangible reinforcement has been shown to 
be more effective in increasing performance than feedback alone 
(Balcazar, Hopkins,&Suarez, 1986; Alvero, Bucklin,&Austin, 2001). 
This evidence supports the use of feedback in combination with an incentive 
program. 
 
Typically, the feedback provided in incentive programs is presented 
as single data points (e.g., Honeywell, Dickinson, & Poling, 1997) or as 
individual graphs of data over time (e.g., LaMere, Dickinson, Henry, 
Henry, & Poling, 1996). The current study presented individual employee 
data represented on a publicly displayed graph so that employees 
could see their individual performance, as well as that of their peers. 
Although peer performance did not affect individual incentive pay, individuals 
were able to compare themselves to the rest of the group to determine 
if they were performing above or below average. 
 
This type of “normative” feedback has been shown to be effective 
when paired with goals. Ludwig and Geller (2000) reported a study that 
posted individual drivers’ names on graphs next to their corresponding 
data points. The results demonstrated that this type of normative feedback 
is more effective than averaged group feedback. In another study, 
Ludwig, Biggs, Wagner, and Geller (2001) paired normative feedback 
with an individual competition among pizza deliverers and demonstrated 
that even deliverers who did not win an award for their safe driving still 
changed their behavior during the program. However, there have been no 
individual monetary incentive program studies that allowed employees to 
see their peers’ performance and incentives gained. 
 
 
 
 
VARIATIONS OF GOALS WITHIN INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
 
Goals are also requisite components of incentive programs because 
they specify the level of performance required to receive the incentive 
pay (Abernathy et al., 1982). When setting goals, it is important to ensure 
that they are difficult, yet attainable (Locke&Latham, 1990). If goals are 
too difficult to reach, they will not be effective in producing changes in 
performance. One potentially effective method of goal setting is to set 
goals that gradually increase in difficulty. This technique of gradually 
changing the goal allows more participants to sample the reinforcer available 
for goal attainment (Kazdin, 1994). If participants are given the op- 
 
portunity to sample the reinforcer, they may be more likely to engage in 
the desired performance and more likely to reach subsequent goals. 
 
Goals can be adapted over time in an incentive program in order to 
provide the participants with an initial opportunity to sample the reinforcer 
before becoming more stringent to shape acceptable levels of 
performance. For example, Ludwig and Geller (2000) described a study 
that provided some participants with goals set near their baseline rate. 
Then goals were raised by an incremental increase each week until 
reaching a final goal (i.e., “tiering”). Likewise, Wilk and Redmon (1990) 
adjusted productivity goals daily for university admissions employees. 
This intervention not only increased employee productivity but also decreased 
absenteeism. The present study used the tiered goal technique 
whereby workers were assigned a new goal every two weeks that increased 
in difficulty over time. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The present study was initiated at the request of management in a 
food distribution warehouse to improve the quality of performance (i.e., 
decreasing errors) among selector employees. The company wanted to 
decrease errors because they were costly both immediately while correcting 
the mistake, and in the future through potential lost customers. 
This study focused on two types of errors: Shorts and mispicks. 
Before the present study, the food distributor already had an incentive 
program in place. It consisted of incentive pay for productivity and 
disincentives for errors. This study examined the effectiveness of an 
adapted incentive program that allowed employees the opportunity to 
earn back disincentive money if they reached the goal. In addition, the 
adapted incentive program included tiered goals and individualized 
normative feedback. The quality of selectors’ performance was expected 
to improve substantially following the introduction of the 
adapted incentive program. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
 
Participants and Setting 
 
The study was conducted at a foodservice distributor in the southeastern 
U.S. that caters to restaurants, schools, and other businesses. 
This company purchases and receives cases of food items from manufacturers 
and stores these items in its warehouse. Orders are received 
 
from customers and filled by selectors who pick food items and assemble 
a delivery pallet. After the orders are prepared, delivery drivers 
transport the food items to the customers. 
 
The participants at the experimental site were selectors (n = 23), responsible 
for assembling food orders to be distributed. The average age 
of the selectors was 23 (range: 19 to 35), they were all males, and, on average, 
were employed less than one year on the job (range 9 months to 
22 months). Participants with less than one year of experience earned 
$10.90 per hour plus incentive pay. Those who worked for more than 
one year but less than two years earned $12.45 per hour plus incentive 
pay. Shifts were eight hours long but an employee could leave when the 
designated orders were completed. All selectors worked in the same 
area of the warehouse and performed the same duties. 
 
A warehouse located in a neighboring state and owned by the same 
foodservice distributor served as a comparison site. The selectors (n = 
14) included in the comparison group were all males with an average 
age of 22 (range: 20 to 31). On average, these selectors had 5 months of 
experience (range: 1 to 13 months). The comparison selectors earned 
the same pay and worked the same number of hours as the selectors in 
the experimental warehouse. 
 
The duties of a selector consist of selecting food items for distribution. 
Selectors first receive an order list for as many as three customers. 
Referring to this list of food items, selectors drive pallet jacks in the 
warehouse to the designated locations of the food items. Cases of food 
items from the order list are then stacked onto pallets on a pallet jack in 
order of the list. Items are listed in a particular order based on weight of 
the item and location of the item in the warehouse. Items that are adjacent 
to one another in the warehouse are listed together. When all items 
have been collected, the selector transports the pallets to the loading 
docks. When an order is complete, selectors begin picking from another 
order list. Order lists are divided among and assigned to 5-7-member 
teams of selectors. When all of the items on the order lists of the team 
for a particular day have been selected, the team members may leave. 
There are, on average, 60 cases per order. Selectors typically pick 20-24 
orders per day. 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Many errors can occur throughout the process of distribution. Errors 
in the form of shorts and mispicks can occur when a selector fills an order. 
A “short” is defined as a desired product being absent from the 
 
filled order. A “mispick” is defined as an incorrect item being placed 
within the filled order. 
 
The shorts and mispicks data were recorded when delivery drivers 
unloaded the order at the customer site. After unloading the food items, 
the driver inspected the delivery and recorded whether there was a short 
or mispick on the invoice. If the mistake was determined after the driver 
left, the customer contacted a sales representative who recorded the error. 
Errors were then recorded into the company database for each order. 
An order number was tied to the selector who filled the particular 
order. In this manner individual selectors’ error rates were tracked 
across the study. 
 
 
 
Baseline 
 
The study included a changing criterion design with a non-treatment 
comparison group. Baseline data were collected for a total of eight 
weeks. During the Baseline period the company maintained its normal 
disincentive program. In this program, selectors were given feedback 
regarding their combined shorts and mispicks per 1000 cases. They received 
access to this feedback on computers located at their workstations 
and on a sheet attached to their weekly paychecks. Measures 
were also taken for case volume, the total number of cases per week. 
Feedback on case volume was also available on the company computers 
and on their weekly paychecks during the entire study. 
 
Selectors received incentive money for productivity and lost money 
for their errors. The incentive pay for productivity was 1.6 cents per 
case selected. As a disincentive, selectors had deducted from their 
earned incentive money $.50 for every short and $1.50 for every 
mispick. On average, selectors were receiving $67.20 for productivity 
and losing $13.29 for errors per week. 
 
 
 
Feedback, Tiered Goals, and Adapted Incentive Program 
 
The intervention consisted of feedback, a changing criterion of tiered 
goals, and an adapted incentive program. It continued for a total of 13 
weeks. The selectors were informed of the intervention in a staff meeting 
at the beginning of the intervention. The Warehouse Manager informed 
the selectors that they would receive weekly graphic feedback 
of their errors and that there would be a new goal for every two weeks 
until reaching a final goal of 1.5 errors per 1000 cases. They were in- 
 
formed that every time they reached the week’s goal, they would earn 
back all of their disincentive money for that week. 
 
Feedback. Individualized graphic feedback was publicly posted to 
show each selector’s average combined number of shorts and mispicks 
per 1000 cases. Individual data for all selectors and the weekly goal 
were represented on the graphs. Data points represented the average 
number of errors per 1000 cases per individual per week. The names of 
the selectors were written next to their corresponding data points each 
week. The weekly goal was represented by a horizontal line. These 
graphs were updated weekly. Data for a particular week (Sunday 
through Thursday) were displayed in a graph on the following Wednesday. 
Each graph displayed the data for the prior two weeks. Please see 
Figure 1 for a facsimile of the feedback graph. 
 
 
Goals. The intervention also consisted of tiered goals set by the management 
team to be achieved by each selector. An ultimate goal of 1.5 
errors per 1000 cases was to be achieved by the 11th week. The initial 
goal for the first two weeks was set at 2.0 errors per 1000 cases. Every 
two weeks thereafter the new goal was reduced by 0.1 errors per 1000 
cases. These weekly goals were represented on the weekly graph of selector 
errors by a horizontal line (see Figure 1). By comparing their 
feedback with the goal level, selectors were able to determine if they 
had reached the goal for the week. 
 
 
Earned-Back Disincentive Pay. At the end of a week, if the selectors’ 
average number of errors per 1000 cases was at or below the current 
goal, that selector avoided losing $.50 for every short and $1.50 for every 
mispick for that week. For example, if a selector’s average number 
of errors per 1000 cases was 1.9 for a week and this was below a goal of 
2.0 errors per 1000 cases, he would not lose the money that the company 
would normally charge. More specifically, if a selector reached the goal 
and yet he still had 11 errors for the week, 6 mispicks and 5 shorts, he 
would not lose the $11.50 from his incentive money for those errors in 
his paycheck on the following Friday. 
 
 
Manipulation Check and Social Validity Questionnaire 
 
Two weeks after the program ended, selectors completed a short 
questionnaire to determine the extent to which they were aware of the 
program. Employees were asked to complete the questionnaire during 
their daily meeting at the beginning of the shift. Items assessed whether 
employees understood the program, had access to the posted feedback 
 
 
 
 
 
graphs, and whether each knew his error rate, the goals for each week, 
and the amount of money he had earned back during the program. 
 
The questionnaire administered to the selectors also assessed social 
validity. The employees were asked whether they thought the program 
was fair, whether they were satisfied with their jobs, and if they wanted 
the program to continue. 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Errors were measured on a weekly basis for 8 weeks during baseline 
and 13 weeks during the intervention phase. To be included in the data 
analysis, selectors must have worked a total of 18 out of the 21 weeks of 
observation. Twelve selectors were eliminated using these criteria. This 
left 23 selectors at the experimental site and 14 selectors at the comparison 
site for the analysis in this study. Management at the comparison 
group did not make individual-level data available to the investigators. 
 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
A questionnaire was administered to the selectors at the experimental 
site to assess the integrity of the intervention. Forty-eight percent of the 
workers who participated in the study filled out the questionnaire. One 
hundred percent of these respondents attended the initial meeting that 
introduced the program and reported being aware of the program. Most 
of the respondents (91%) remembered when the program began. Sixtyfour 
percent were aware of the first goal of 2.0 errors per 1000 cases 
while 82% knew the final goal of 1.5 errors per 1000 cases. All respondents 
reported that they had knowledge of their individual error rate 
during the program. Eighty-two percent looked at the feedback graph at 
least occasionally. Ninety-one percent reported comparing their error 
rate to the weekly goal and 91% reported comparing their error rate to 
the rates of others. 
 
 
Error Rate 
 
The selector error rates for the experimental group across the 
21-week project are represented in Figure 2. The changing criterion for 
the experimental group is represented in two-week intervals by shortened 
vertical lines in Figure 2. The published goal for each two-week 
interval also appears in Figure 2. 
 
The mean number of errors per 1000 cases for the experimental 
group during baseline was 3.16 (SD = .26; range: 2.26 to 3.41). This decreased 
to a mean of 2.54 (SD = .48; range: 1.83 to 3.40) errors per 1000 
cases during the intervention phase. The start of the intervention was 
marked by a decrease in error rate at the experimental site during the 
first week followed by an immediate increase back to baseline levels. 
After this initial temporary impact there was a downward trend during 
the remainder of the intervention. All but 2 of the weekly error ratios 
 
during the 13-week intervention phase fell below the mean baseline 
level. Overall there were more mispicks per 1000 cases than shorts, 
however, the trends for both mispicks and shorts were very similar. 
 
The error rate for the week of December 2nd (see circle “A” on Figure 
2) was considerably higher than results from other weeks. This was 
due to a significant internal mishap that was out of the selectors’ control. 
If the data point for the week of December 2nd is eliminated, error 
rate data for the week of October 28 through the final week suggests a 
notable downward trend consistent with the changing goal criterion. 
 
The selector error rates for the comparison group are represented in 
Figure 3. The error rate for the comparison group is markedly higher 
and more variable than the error rate for the experimental group. The 
mean number of errors per 1000 cases for the comparison group was 
6.49 (SD = 1.14; range: 5.46 to 8.10) during the baseline phase at the experimental 
site. During the intervention at the experimental site, the 
mean error rate at the comparison site was 5.62 (SD = 1.0; range: 4.23 to 
6.78). A downward trend similar to the experimental group was not observed 
in the error rate of the comparison group (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percent of Selectors Achieving the Goal 
 
The final goal during the intervention was 1.5 errors per 1000 cases. 
Figure 4 displays the percentage of selectors who achieved the goal of 
1.5 errors per 1000 cases per week. The mean percentage of selectors 
below the goal was 36.4% during baseline, and 42.0% during the intervention. 
During the last three weeks of the intervention, over 47% of the 
selectors were below this goal. 
 
Error Rate by Baseline Responding 
For further analysis, selectors in the experimental group were divided 
into groups based on their average error rates during baseline. Ten 
 
 
 
selectors whose error rate was below 2.00 errors per 1000 cases are represented 
as “Group 1.” Seven selectors whose average error rates were 
between 2.00 and 3.50 errors per 1000 cases are represented as “Group 
2.” Finally, six selectors with average error rates above 3.5 errors per 
1000 cases are represented as “Group 3.” The data for all three groups 
are represented in Figure 5. 
 
The average weekly error rate for selectors in Group 1 was 1.34 errors 
per 1000 cases (SD = .41; range: 0.60 to 1.87) during baseline. The 
average error rate during the intervention was 1.34 errors per 1000 cases 
(SD = .54; range: 0.73 to 2.51), which was equal to the average error rate 
during baseline. 
 
The average weekly error rate for Group 2 decreased from 2.82 (SD = 
.57; range: 2.16 to 3.97) during baseline to 2.21 (SD = .84; range: .68 to 
4.09) during the intervention. A large increase in error rate occurred 
during the week of December 2nd in the intervention. After December 
2nd the error rate steadily decreased to a low of 0.68 errors per 1000 
cases. All but one of the data points during intervention fell below the 
baseline mean. An example selector from this group appears in Figure 
6. SelectorAhad an error rate in baseline just above the initial goal level 
of 2.0 errors per 1000 cases. He earned back his disincentive during the 
 
 
 
 
first week of the intervention and another 7 times over the intervention 
phase (highlighted by arrows in Figure 6). There is also a notable downward 
trend in his error rate over the course of the intervention phase. 
 
The average error rate for Group 3 during baseline was 5.44 (SD = 
1.13; range: 3.48 to 6.88). Mean selector error rate during the intervention 
phase was 4.85 (SD = 1.18; range: 3.39 to 6.90). A noticeable decrease 
occurred during the first week, followed by an increase back to 
baseline levels. The final three weeks remained below 3.5 errors per 
1000 cases. An example selector from this group appears in Figure 7. 
Selector B had an exceptionally high error rate in baseline that decreased 
substantially during the intervention. However, Selector B was 
never able to reduce his error rate below the goal level (2.0-1.5 errors 
per 1000 cases). 
 
One selector, initially categorized in Group 1, demonstrated a contraindicative 
pattern of responding (see Figure 8). Selector C’s baseline error 
rate was within the future goal level. In fact, he earned back his 
disincentive four times during the intervention (highlighted by arrows). 
However, after a month of the intervention contingencies his error rate 
trended upward, eventually increasing to twice his baseline level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Validity 
 
Social validity was assessed through a questionnaire administered two 
weeks after the study. When asked about the fairness of the program, 
73% thought the program was “fair” or “very fair.” The remaining 27% 
responded “neutral”. Seventy-three percent reported being “satisfied” or 
“very satisfied” with their jobs during the program. No one stated that 
they were “dissatisfied” during this time period. Ninety-one percent of 
the respondents believed that the program “should continue.” 
 
Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
A cost benefit analysis was conducted to determine the value of the 
program to the company. There were 4141 total errors during baseline. 
If the errors during the intervention had continued steadily at the same 
rate as the rate during baseline, the total cumulative errors would have 
been 10,914. The actual total cumulative number of errors by the end of 
the intervention was 9,532. This results in a difference between projected 
cumulative errors and actual cumulative errors of 1,382. Each error 
was estimated to cost the company $7.50 by the manager of the 
 
 
 
 
warehouse based on benchmarks from other similar food distribution 
companies. The savings experienced from the avoided 1,382 errors during 
the 13-week program was therefore estimated to be $10,365. 
 
The total amount that would have been collected from the selectors 
via disincentives during the intervention was $5,736.50. The amount of 
 
money that was given back to selectors when they met the weekly goal 
totaled $565.50. Thus, an average of $24 was returned to employees 
each week during this program. More accurately, there were 13 selectors 
who received returned money, these individuals received an average 
of $43.50 per week during this program. After subtracting the total 
amount repaid to selectors (the only costs incurred by the company in 
this study), the amount saved to the company is estimated to be 
$9,799.50. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The goal of this study was to evaluate the effects of an adapted incentive 
program with tiered goals and normative feedback on the error rate 
of selectors at a distribution warehouse. The intervention was associated 
with a decrease in the selector error rate for the experimental group. 
The start of the intervention was marked by a considerable decrease in 
error rate at the experimental site. This may be the result of management’s 
strong initial support and communication of the program. The 
second week of the intervention was marked by a large increase in error 
rate back to baseline levels. A continuous downward trend was then observed 
during the remaining 11 weeks whereby most of the data points 
fell below the baseline mean. 
 
The week of December 2nd was marked by a considerable increase 
in error rate for the experimental group. According to management, numerous 
cases of a popular item were labeled incorrectly when the shipment 
was received during that week. Selectors picking that item in their 
order inadvertently got the wrong case(s) or otherwise skipped the 
case(s) causing a significant number of mispicks and shorts until the situation 
was resolved later that week. If the data point for the week of December 
2nd is eliminated, the remaining data show a notable downward 
trend in the experimental group’s error rate during the fourth week 
through the final week with all points below the baseline mean. 
 
Such a downward trend may be expected when intervening with 
tiered goals within the changing criterion design of the study. Tiered 
goals are set at a beginning level suspected to be achievable by most 
participants. Yet initial behavioral change would be limited because of 
the lenient goal. However, as time goes by the goal becomes more and 
more difficult to achieve (i.e., the criterion changed) and the amount of 
behavior change required is greater. Thus, one would expect a trend in 
the same direction as the trend in the tiered goals. 
 
 
Sampling the Contingency 
 
Another method of demonstrating the effect of the intervention was 
to examine the percentage of selectors who achieved the goal on a 
weekly basis. The mean percentage of selectors achieving the goal increased 
during the intervention. In addition, there was an upward trend 
of selectors achieving the goal during the intervention. It is noteworthy 
that nearly half of the selectors were below the goal during the last three 
weeks. 
 
Those individuals who have sampled the contingency by achieving 
the lenient goal early may be more likely to increase their efforts as the 
goals become more difficult. This was demonstrated by Selector A 
whose error rate during baseline was just above the goal level. He 
achieved the goal initially and continued to decrease his error rate as the 
goal level became more stringent. Other selectors whose baseline was 
close to the goal also seemed to be in the best position to benefit from 
the intervention (i.e., Group 2). All of this group’s weekly data points 
except one (December 2nd) during the intervention fell below the baseline 
mean. It is evident that the intervention had the most significant effect 
on error rate for this subsample of selectors. 
 
In contrast, those individuals whose behaviors did not approximate 
the goal were not able to sample the contingency. These individuals 
with error rates considerably higher than the goal may not be able to 
change their behavior enough to “catch” up with the increasingly difficult 
goals. A good example of this was Selector B who decreased his error 
rate by 50% by the end of the intervention yet never achieved the 
goal or earned back his disincentive. Other selectors who had very high 
error rates during baseline decreased their error rate considerably, however 
it was still significantly higher than the goal. Like Selector B, these 
individuals were performing at a level that was so far from the goal, that 
it was difficult for them to change their behavior enough to reach the 
goal and sample the reinforcer. 
 
This finding supports the suggestion by Ludwig et al. (2001) that it 
may not be necessary to sample the reinforcer in order to change behavior. 
Instead, the goal setting paired with the chance to earn back money 
may have resulted in rule-governed behavior (Blakely & Schlinger, 
1987) by the selectors. 
 
Another possible explanation for changes in behavior in those selectors 
who never earned back their disincentives may be the social contingencies 
presumably generated by other intervention operations (i.e., 
normative feedback and error rate goals). Social contingencies are 
 
thought to be strongest when (a) others expect designated behaviors (as 
implied by the management-mandated goals), (b) have opportunities to 
observe whether the behaviors occur (via the feedback graphs with 
names), and (c) when peers or superiors are willing to promote these behaviors 
consistently with approving (rewarding) or disapproving (punishing) 
consequences (Anderson, Chiricos, & Waldo, 1977; Sussman, 
1989). Although the current research did not assess these variables directly, 
we agree with Poling, Smith, and Braatz (1993) who called for 
more systematic measures of social interaction resulting from an intervention 
process (e.g., monitoring the verbal behavior of selectors interacting 
with one another or with management). 
 
Of course, those individuals already achieving the goal rate during 
baseline would have no need to improve their behaviors since the current 
rate would be reinforced. Indeed, those individuals whose baseline 
behavior was already below the goal levels may not have been affected 
by the intervention because they were already performing at the desired 
levels and no further reinforcement was offered for lower rates of errors. 
If additional goals below 1.5 errors per 1000 cases were presented 
along with additional incentives the performance of these individuals 
may continue to improve. Alternatively, the lack of significant improvement 
in error rate may have been a function of a floor effect. 
These selectors were already performing at a level close to zero, and 
therefore may not have been able to reduce their error rate significantly. 
 
It is notable that one individual increased his error rate substantially 
during the intervention. Specifically, Selector C showed an increasing 
trend in error rate to a level twice his baseline mean. This is similar to 
examples reported in Ludwig and Geller (1991) where one pizza deliverer 
decreased his safety-belt use from around 100% during baseline to 
0% at one point during the intervention phase and another reported in 
Ludwig and Geller (2000) who decreased his turn signal use from a 
baseline mean of 83% to a low of 25% toward the end of the intervention. 
Seemingly, a small number of individuals will respond negatively 
to these types of intervention operations. These instances may be similar 
to what Skinner (1971) referred to as countercontrol. 
Social Validity and Cost-Benefit 
 
The social validity questionnaire findings suggest that the adapted incentive 
program was well received by the employees. Because most respondents 
thought the program was fair, they were satisfied with their 
jobs, and they wanted the program to continue, it seems that no harmful 
 
effects were experienced. The program not only benefited management, 
it also benefited the employees. On average, selectors who were successful 
in earning back money saved an average of $43.50 during the 
course of this study. 
 
Another measure of social validity specific to business is the effect 
on profitability. Even though the intervention produced a moderate effect 
on selector error rate and employees approved of the program, the 
company must save money in order for it to be considered by management 
to be successful (i.e., practical significance). The cost-benefit 
analysis suggests that the 13-week program saved the company money. 
The estimated savings to the company was $9,799.50 for the entire 
13-week period. If the host company would have kept this program in 
place for a year they may have realized an annualized savings of approximately 
$40,000. If the selectors maintained the same error rate as 
they accomplished in the last 4 weeks of the study, the estimated savings 
may indeed be greater. 
 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
 
One limitation of the study was the lack of individual data for the selectors 
at the comparison site. The authors were unable to have access to 
individual data for the selectors in the comparison group. Inferential 
statistical analyses such as mixed design ANOVAs would have been 
possible if these data were available. In addition, the comparison group 
was not ideal for comparison with the experimental group. Even though 
the warehouse was similar and owned by the same company, the number 
of errors was considerably higher and more variable at the comparison 
site. 
 
A longer baseline period would have also been preferable, however, 
another program targeting a number of performance factors was in 
place prior to August. A longer baseline was not used because the authors 
did not want the baseline to be contaminated by the previous program. 
 
Additionally, the study would have been more rigorous if a return to 
baseline followed the intervention. Although the disincentive payback 
program was ceased at the end of the study, a true return to baseline was 
impossible due to changes that management implemented immediately 
following the adapted incentive program. One of these changes included 
the change from 8 to 10-hour shifts. Such a change is likely to 
cause increases in error due to factors like fatigue, suggesting that the 
results of the study are somewhat conservative. Because of this and 
 
other changes in policy and staffing at the experimental site, management 
decided not to continue the intervention in the absence of the research 
team. Future researchers should consider designing a “transition 
plan” or other methods for indigenous intervention management to 
better ensure maintenance of successful intervention programs. 
 
A factor that may have affected the reported error rates was a possible 
seasonal variation experienced at the distribution warehouses. The 
program occurred during two holidays that could have contributed to 
less demand. This makes sense because some of the customers of the 
warehouse include schools, which are not in session during the holiday 
season. When there is less demand, each selector receives a smaller 
caseload for the day. When this happens, selectors have the ability to 
work slower and consequently may commit fewer errors. However, selectors 
are allowed to leave when their work is finished and are paid for 
8-hours of work regardless of when they finish. The ability to leave 
early may be more reinforcing and therefore counteract the tendency to 
slow down. 
 
A suggestion for improving the program is to use an initial goal that 
is less difficult to achieve. This study used tiered goals so that employees 
would initially be able to sample the reinforcer. However, the initial 
goal of 2.0 errors per 1000 cases may have been too difficult for the majority 
of selectors to be able to attain it. It may be beneficial to set a more 
lenient initial goal (e.g., 3.0 errors per 1000 cases) and decrease it by 
larger increments than 0.1 errors per 1000 cases. This study was not 
able to implement a lenient goal due to management’s disapproval of 
rewarding employees at a level higher than 2.0. Another suggestion is to 
use individually-set goals. Rather than utilizing one company-wide set 
of goals, management could set goals for each selector based on their 
previous individual performance. 
 
The data demonstrate that there were some selectors whose error 
rates were extremely high (i.e., a baseline mean of 5.44 errors per 1000 
cases). Clearly this level is unacceptable to management. A suggestion 
is to provide training for the selectors with high error rates. It is possible 
that these selectors were unaware of how to avoid errors. If employees 
lack the skills, reinforcement will not contribute to improvements in 
their performance. 
 
A final suggestion for improving the intervention would be to use incentives 
rather than disincentives to increase quality. When negative reinforcers, 
such as disincentives, are used, employees may only do the 
minimum to get by (Daniels, 1989). (We view disincentives in this context 
as reinforcers because most of the errors in this study’s context 
 
were due to the lack of correct behaviors. A mispick is not a behavior; 
instead it is the absence of a correct behavior. Therefore, the [dis]incentives 
are considered to increase correct behavior). In addition, negative 
reinforcement is associated with many negative side effects, such as aggression 
and fear (Martin & Pear, 1996) or even countercontrol (Ludwig 
& Geller, 2000). Therefore, it may be more beneficial to use 
positive reinforcement, such as dropping the disincentive system altogether 
and focus on the use of incentives, to improve the quality of selectors’ 
performance. 
 
This study was unique in that it was the first to examine earned-back 
disincentive pay as part of an incentive program. In addition, it examined 
both normative feedback and tiered (i.e., changing) goals in combination 
with the adapted incentive program. Both normative feedback 
and tiered goals have been studied in the literature, but not in combination 
with an incentive program. The results of the present study support 
the previous findings that these independent variables produce significant 
improvements in performance. In addition, the present study supports 
the use of programs that utilize the repayment of disincentives to 
improve quality. Future research should continue to examine the effects 
of the repayment of disincentives on quality, as well as on other dependent 
variables. 
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